Research statement
My approach to the topic of normative reasons is characterized by a desire to situate reasons within a constellation of concepts in which no star shines too brightly. I take pride in offering views which foreground mutual interrelations rather than suppressing or ostracizing them, and this reflects a general reluctance to compromise a view’s extensional adequacy for greater simplicity. Hence my projects are by their nature synthetic and ecumenical rather than unrealistically reductive or ideologically pure.
Evidence of this philosophical bent is present from the first chapter of my dissertation, When Reasons Run Out, where I explore and evaluate several novel ways for source externalists about practical reasons to accommodate what is compelling and insightful in views which ground reasons in facts about an agent’s desire-like attitudes. My first chapter is part of a larger project which has the aim of defending source externalism from subjectivists, on the one hand, and from voluntarists on the other.
Chapter 2 continues in this spirit. In this chapter tentatively titled Good deliberationism, I seek to wed elements of two popular accounts of normative reasons together in a way that articulates a deep connection between normative explanation and justification. At the same time, I make several formulary innovations which allow the resulting view to avoid objections which stifle the original accounts.
The third and final chapter of my dissertation is at present a matter of hushed speculation. Rumor has it, though, that it will reprise the themes explored in the first two chapters with such clarity and depth as to more or less obviate all work done on the subject before 1975. Alternatively, it may just be about the connection between reasons and reasoning.
Evidence of this philosophical bent is present from the first chapter of my dissertation, When Reasons Run Out, where I explore and evaluate several novel ways for source externalists about practical reasons to accommodate what is compelling and insightful in views which ground reasons in facts about an agent’s desire-like attitudes. My first chapter is part of a larger project which has the aim of defending source externalism from subjectivists, on the one hand, and from voluntarists on the other.
Chapter 2 continues in this spirit. In this chapter tentatively titled Good deliberationism, I seek to wed elements of two popular accounts of normative reasons together in a way that articulates a deep connection between normative explanation and justification. At the same time, I make several formulary innovations which allow the resulting view to avoid objections which stifle the original accounts.
The third and final chapter of my dissertation is at present a matter of hushed speculation. Rumor has it, though, that it will reprise the themes explored in the first two chapters with such clarity and depth as to more or less obviate all work done on the subject before 1975. Alternatively, it may just be about the connection between reasons and reasoning.
Papers
1. A paper on the normative authority of favoring attitudes: liking, desiring, preferring, being attracted to, and so forth. I argue that while these attitudes are practically relevant (or normatively significant), they are not normative in the way that has typically been theorized. In fact, they are not sources of reasons at all. I offer an alternative, externalist-friendly account of conative attitudes according to which they serve as triggers for rational requirements. (Under Review)
2. A paper developing a novel account of normative reasons. This paper will be presented at the 2024 Central APA in New Orleans. (In progress)
3. A paper on the normativity of our commitments, intentions, plans, and other volitional phenomena. I argue that recent prominent arguments for the claim that the will is a source of normativity fail, and in fact the normativity of these volitional states is well-accommodated by understanding the will as a mere modifier of our pre-existing external reasons. This paper will be presented at the 2024 Eastern APA in New York. (In progress)
I love exchanging my work with others. Please reach out if you want would like to see any of this work.
2. A paper developing a novel account of normative reasons. This paper will be presented at the 2024 Central APA in New Orleans. (In progress)
3. A paper on the normativity of our commitments, intentions, plans, and other volitional phenomena. I argue that recent prominent arguments for the claim that the will is a source of normativity fail, and in fact the normativity of these volitional states is well-accommodated by understanding the will as a mere modifier of our pre-existing external reasons. This paper will be presented at the 2024 Eastern APA in New York. (In progress)
I love exchanging my work with others. Please reach out if you want would like to see any of this work.
