Work in progress
1. A paper that analyzes normative reasons in terms of good reasoning. I presented this paper at the Central APA in 2024.
2. A paper about the metaphysics of normative reasons. According to atomists, a basic normative reason is a singular fact, like the fact that it is raining. According to cluster theorists, a basic reason is a collection of non-overlapping facts called a normative cluster. I stick up for the little guy: atomism.
3. A paper with Sophia Arbeiter concerning the rational evaluability of unalterable attitudes (e.g., delusions).
I love exchanging my work with others. Please reach out if you want to see any of this work.
1. A paper that analyzes normative reasons in terms of good reasoning. I presented this paper at the Central APA in 2024.
2. A paper about the metaphysics of normative reasons. According to atomists, a basic normative reason is a singular fact, like the fact that it is raining. According to cluster theorists, a basic reason is a collection of non-overlapping facts called a normative cluster. I stick up for the little guy: atomism.
3. A paper with Sophia Arbeiter concerning the rational evaluability of unalterable attitudes (e.g., delusions).
I love exchanging my work with others. Please reach out if you want to see any of this work.
Research Themes
The normative significance of desire
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Permissive choices are those in which your normative reasons do not require you to select any particular option. Many of us have the Subjectivist’s Intuition: we think that it would be rational or sensible, broadly construed, to make such choices simply by choosing what we like, desire, or prefer (most). But why is this a rational way to make these choices, if not simply because favoring something gives you some reason to choose it?
In this project, I explore an alternative possibility, namely that favoring attitudes can serve as a rational basis for choice without being normative reasons. This move allows externalists about reasons to vindicate the thought that our attitudes play a central role in these choices, but without compromising on the her claim that normativity has its source in the external world. |
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Commitment and the will
The fact that I am a committed gardener clearly has some practical relevance. But what, exactly, are the rational or normative implications of my being committed to gardening? In particular, how does my commitment to gardening alter the deontic status or the rationality of my subsequent decision to garden rather than woodwork?
- On one prominent view, commitment's practical relevance is cashed out directly in terms of reasons: my commitment to gardening provides me with a further reason to garden. According to an alternative, my commitment to gardening does not directly provide me with any reasons for action, but instead makes itself felt by requiring me to deliberate about how to spend my afternoon in a gardening-friendly way.