Research Themes
Desire and Choice
Permissive choices are those in which your normative reasons do not require you to select any particular option. Many of us have the Subjectivist’s Intuition: we think that it would be rational or sensible, broadly construed, to make such choices simply by choosing what we like, desire, or prefer (most). But why is this a rational way to make these choices, if not simply because favoring something gives you some reason to choose it?
In this project, I explore an alternative possibility, namely that favoring attitudes can serve as a rational basis for choice without being normative reasons. This move allows externalists about reasons to vindicate the thought that our attitudes play a central role in these choices, but without compromising on the her claim that normativity has its source in the external world.
In this project, I explore an alternative possibility, namely that favoring attitudes can serve as a rational basis for choice without being normative reasons. This move allows externalists about reasons to vindicate the thought that our attitudes play a central role in these choices, but without compromising on the her claim that normativity has its source in the external world.
Commitment and the will